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This  paper  examines  a  combined  set  of  corporate  governance  features  that 
influence disclosure quality in a context of ownership concentration. Agency theory 
presents  a  theoretical  framework  linking  disclosure  decision  to  corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Using  a  Multiple  Correspondence  Analysis  (MCA),  we  find  that  firms  with  poor 
disclosure quality have higher ownership concentration, are family controlled, have 
a  low  proportion  of  outside  directors  in  the  board,  little  presence  of  institutional 
investors in the capital shares, no executive stock options plans, and present dual 
class shares. The MCA results also show that firms with good disclosure are not 
controlled  by  families  and  are  characterised  by  a  high  proportion  of  outside 
directors  in  the  board,  ownership  dispersion  and  a  significant  presence  of 
institutional investors in the capital shares. As a confirmatory analysis, we use a 
binary LOGIT. After controlling for size, multiple listing and CAC40 membership, the 
results  confirm  a  negative  association  between  disclosure  quality  and  family 
control, double voting shares grant, and ownership concentration. The results also 
show  a  positive  relationship  between  disclosure  quality  and  the  presence  of 
executive stock options plans, and the proportion of independent directors in the 
board. These findings shed the light on corporate governance features that enhance 
incentives for good disclosure under high ownership concentration. 
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Disclosure quality and corporate governance: Evidence from the French Stock Market 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS  
Following  recent  financial  scandals,  corporate  governance  has  drawn  the  attention  of  regulators  and  policy 
makers (NRE act, Bouton report (2002), LSF act…). On one hand, the LSF act, similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
act in USA, fight opaqueness and requires companies to present to general meeting, the organization of the 
works of the board, the internal control procedures and the delegation of powers. On the other hand, the NRE act 
reinforces the advertising of shareholders' treaties (pactes d’actionnaires) and incites to reveal shareholder’s 
identity; it also widened the shareholder right for information by getting rid of the possibility of subordinating in 
the corporate status the right to participate in general meetings to the possession of a minimal number of shares. 
 
The present study examines the impact of several corporate governance mechanisms on disclosure quality. Early 
research has examined the effect of different governance mechanisms in a single study. These mechanisms deal 
with: the proportion of independent directors in the board (Chen and Jaggi’s, 2000, Forker, 1992, Dechow et al., 
1996, Beasley, 1996), the board size, the unitary leadership structure (Wong, 2001, Forker, 1992), ownership 
structure and shareholders relationships (Ho and Wong, 2001, Chau and Gray, 2002), institutional investors’ 
activism (Bushee and Noe, 2001, Elgazzar, 1998). 
 
Although extensive research had been made in the US where the ownership is dispersed and investors are highly 
protected, work on the association between corporate governance and disclosure in Europe and particularly in 
France is still incipient. There are at least three reasons why the relation between disclosure and corporate 
governance  for  French  companies  deserves  a  deeper  analysis.  First,  ownership  structure  in  France  is 
concentrated and investors are less protected then in common law countries such as the USA. Second, many 
listed  French  firms  are  controlled  and  managed  by  families  while  the  separation  between  ownership  and 
management is the main form of corporate governance in the USA. Finally, French firms, as European ones in 
general, are less transparent and have less frequent disclosures than their Anglo-American counterparts.  
 
We measure disclosure quality using the annual report prices of AGEFI and Euronext. First, we carried out a 
multiple correspondences analysis (MCA) after recoding the quantitative variables. The use of the MCA permit 
us to study and to put in evidence on the mapping not only the strong values of the variables but also the weak 
ones. Therefore, it permitted us to characterise better both groups of firms of the sample, namely those who have 
a good disclosure quality and those who have poor disclosure quality. The result of the MCA shows that firms 
with poor disclosure quality are characterised by a high ownership concentration in the hands of families, a low 
proportion of outside directors in the board, little presence of institutional investors in the capital shares, no 
executive stock options plans and the presence of dual class shares. On the other hand, we find that firms with 
good disclosure are not controlled by families and are characterised by a high proportion of outside directors in 
the board, ownership dispersion, and a significant presence of institutional investors in the capital. Second, using 
a binary LOGIT regression, we find a negative association between ownership concentration and disclosure 
quality.  One  explanation  for  this  relationship  is  that  under  high  ownership  concentration,  controlling 
shareholders are less reliant on minority shareholders and may expropriate them; therefore, they have fewer 
incentives to disclose information and they prefer to retain it. The results also show a negative association 
between family control and disclosure quality. This is consistent with the assumption that family controlled firms 
have  little  incentive  to  disclose  information  to  public  because  these  families  hold  many  of  the  senior  staff 
positions; therefore the demand for information in such companies is relatively low because the major investors 
already have that information. Finally, we find that disclosure quality is negatively associated with double voting 
rights shares. 
 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  two  reviews  prior  literature  and  presents  the 
hypotheses development. Section three provides a description of our sample and variable measurement. Results 
and conclusions are exhibited at sections four and five, respectively.   3
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This article aims to explain the differences in financial disclosure quality for French firms considering various 
attributes of corporate governance. Following Charreaux (1996, 1997), we define corporate governance as “All 
the organisational mechanisms which have the effect of bounding the powers and of influencing the decisions of 
the  managers, in other  words,  which delimit  their driving and define their discretionary space”
1. Corporate 
attributes  examined  in  this  study  consist  of  ownership  structure,  institutional  investor’s  ownership,  board 
characteristics (board size, proportion of outside director in the board), the presence of a unitary leadership 
structure (CEO/chairman) and the existence of executive incentives based on stock prices. 
  Corporate disclosure and institutional activism  
Institutional  investors  play  a  major  role  in  financial  market.  Recent  articles  published  in  financial  press 
documented  the  institutional  investor  activism  and  their  will  to  constrain  managers  to  respect  corporate 
governance  practises  and  to  improve  transparency  (Medidep  general  meeting  (les  Echos  16/09/05),  Alcatel 
general  meeting  (Le  Figaro  10/04/03),  ABN-AMRO  (le  Temps  22/02/07),  Vivendi  Universal  (la  Tribune 
02/05/05)). Moreover, institutional investors are the major suppliers of funds in financial market. They often 
hold large blocks of shares in larges firms which leads them to become the main actor in corporate governance 
structures. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) report that the presence of institutional investors in the capital shares is 
considered as a manager control mechanism. 
 
Bushee and Noe (2000) argue that institutional investors are sensitive to corporate disclosure practices. First, 
institutional investors might be attracted to firms with good disclosure quality because such disclosure could 
reduce the price impact of trades. Second, good disclosure may influence the potential for profitable trading 
opportunities which raises the interest of institutional investors. Also, institutions that are active in corporate 
governance could prefer firms with informative disclosure if they rely on public disclosure or they do not have 
enough resources to engage in private information. Finally, corporate disclosure is a low-cost mechanism for 
monitoring  manager performance; therefore, institutional  investors  have  incentives to  constrain  managers to 
disclose relevant information. Elgazzar (1998) argues that large institutional ownership may induce a higher 
level of voluntary disclosure. This finding is also supported by Bushee and Noe (2001). The discussion here 
leads us to test the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between institutional investor’s ownership and disclosure quality. 
  Corporate disclosure and board characteristics 
According to Williamson (1985, p. 47), opportunism " . . . refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, obfuscate or otherwise confus"'. Williamson's 
(1985) analysis of transaction costs provides a framework linking disclosure quality to corporate governance. 
According  to  Forker  (1992),  “Management  are  assumed  to  balance  potential  benefits  from  less  disclosure 
against costs in the form of lower share prices and increased threat of takeover and to choose the quality of 
disclosure which minimises the costs they incur”; therefore, adoption of internal control devices such as outside 
directors,  executive stock compensation and separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive officer, 
enhance monitoring quality and reduce benefits from withholding information; resulting in disclosure quality 
improvement. 
 
Fama (1980) suggests that some board characteristics help ensuring managers monitoring. The objective of this 
study is to show how some characteristics of the board could constrain manager to improve their transparency 
and to work in accordance with shareholders’ expectations. Previous studies have identified three main board 
characteristics  affecting  the  monitoring  efficiency  i.e.  board  independent  directors,  board  size  and  board 
leadership structure (Chen et Jaggi’s, 2000; Forker, 1992; Jensen et Meckling, 1983; Ho and Wong, 2001). 
 
                                                 
1 Charreaux (1997) « … l’ensemble des mécanismes organisationnels qui ont pour effet de délimiter les pouvoirs 
et d’influencer les décisions des dirigeants, autrement dit, qui ‘gouvernent’ leur conduite et définissent leur 
espace discrétionnaire ».   4
Inclusion of independent directors on corporate boards started to receive increasing attention (Vienot report 
(1995), Bouton report (2002)). Chen and Jaggi (2000) present two main arguments in support of independent 
directors. First, independent directors provide advice to corporate boards on strategic decisions,  which  may 
improve the firm’s economic and financial performance. Second, independent directors have more incentives to 
monitor  management  decisions  and  activities.  Fama  (1980)  assumes  that  outside  directors  are  the  ultimate 
internal monitor of managerial decision-making, whose task is to protect the interests of the shareholders. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) suggest that boards composed of a higher proportion of independent directors have greater 
control  and  monitoring  on  managerial  decisions.  In  addition,  it  is  assumed  that  independent  directors  have 
incentives to exercise their decision control in order to maintain reputational capital.  
 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1983), we assume that outside directors have incentives to develop reputations 
as experts in decision control. In fact, most outside directors of open corporations are either managers of other 
corporations  or  important  decision  agents  in  other  complex  organisations.  Consequently,  the  value  of  their 
human capital depends primarily on their performance as internal decision managers in other organisations. 
 
Prior research finds a positive relation between the proportion of outside directors in the board and financial 
statement frauds risks (Dechow, Sloan et Sweeney (1996), Beasley (1996)). The presence of outside directors 
ensures that the monitoring of the board is effective. In fact, when the board is dominated by non independent 
directors,  complicity  between  manager  and  board  members  could  happen.  This  could  harm  shareholder’s 
interests and firm transparency.  
 
Cheng and Jaggi (2000) document that « Monitoring of corporate boards by INDs suggests that corporate boards 
will become more responsive to investors, and inclusion of INDs on boards will improve the firm's compliance 
with the disclosure requirements which in turn will enhance the comprehensiveness and quality of disclosures ». 
 
Using a sample of 82 UK listed companies on the period 1988-1989, Forker (1992) shows a positive association 
between financial disclosure  quality and the proportion of outsiders directors on the board. Eng and Mak's 
(2003) direct measure of nonmandatory disclosure is significantly and negatively associated with the proportion 
of independent directors. We thus test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between the proportion of outside directors and disclosure quality. 
 
Mak and Li (2001) argue that when a single individual wears the hats of both the CEO and chairman of the board 
(unitary leadership structure), managerial dominance is greatly enhanced since that individual is more aligned 
with management than with stockholders. Ho and Wong (2001) assert that Firms whose have one individual who 
serves as both chairman and chief executive officer/managing director (CEO duality) are considered to be more 
managerially dominated. Consequently, the person who occupies both roles would tend to withhold unfavorable 
information. 
 
In France, the Vienot report (1999) and the NRE act (2001) recommend the dissociation between the CEO and 
the board chairman position in order to balance of power between the board who control manager and the CEO 
who make daily actions. However, when the CEO is the chairman, the board couldn’t be an effective to control 
manager decision because it will  be difficult to limit the decision discretion of individual top managers since the 
chairman of the board is also part of the top management. 
 
Ho and Wong (2001) assert that Firms that have one individual who serves as both chairman and CEO (CEO 
duality) are considered to be more managerially dominated. Consequence, the person who occupies both roles 
would tend to withhold unfavorable information. Forker (1992) find that CEO/chairman duality is negatively 
associated with disclosure quality. 
 
H3: there is a negative relation between unitary leadership structure and disclosure quality. 
 
In respect to the size of the board, John and Senbet (1998) suggest that while the board's monitoring capacities 
increase as the number of members on the board increases, this benefit may be offset by the incremental cost of 
poorer communication and decision making efficiencies that are often associated with large groups. Many prior 
studies basing their models on principles of cohesion of the groups, suggest the benefits of small sized board 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Brown and Mahoney, 1992). In fact, with dispersed opinions and non-cohesiveness 
in viewpoints, a board that is too large may actually have diminished monitoring capabilities. The results of 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) are consistent with this suggestion. Empirically, Yermack (1996) 
find that firm valuation negatively related to the size of the board. Thus, there is no preponderance of theory   5
empirical evidence to suggest a relation between board size and levels of voluntary disclosure, and it remains an 
empirical issue. The hypothesis in relation to board size and disclosure quality is stated in the null: 
 
H4: There is no association between board size and disclosure quality 
  Corporate disclosure and executive stock-option plans 
According to agency theory, shareholders have incentive to pay for monitoring expenditures to protect their 
wealth from manager expropriation. Managers who benefits from stock option plans should have a concern 
about the economic consequences of their actions since their wealth depends of firm value. Also, disclosure 
enhance  firm  liquidity  and  firm’s  value  therefore,  managers  interested  in  trading  their  stock  holdings  have 
incentives to improve their disclosure to increase liquidity and their stock value. 
 
Nagar et al. (2003) study a sample of 1129 firms during 1992-1995 and examine the relation between managers' 
disclosure activities and their stock price-based incentives. They find that stock price-based incentives in the 
form  of  stock-based  compensation  mitigate  agency  problem.  The  authors  show  that  firms'  disclosures  are 
positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation affected by stock and suggest that shareholders choose 
to recourse to stock options to reach target level of disclosure. We then hypothesize that firms offering stock 
option plans to managers provide good quality of disclosure:  
 
H5: there is a positive association between disclosure quality and executive stock option compensation 
  Corporate disclosure and ownership structure  
According to agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest the separation between ownership and control 
of a firm raises agency costs due to conflicts of interest between manager and shareholders. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) point out that in case of widely held ownership, the potential for conflicts between principal and agent is 
greater than in more closely held companies. “As a result, information disclosure is likely to be greater in widely 
held firms so that principals can effectively monitor that their economic interests are optimized and agents can 
signal that they act in the best interests of the owners” Chau and Gray (2002). Research is very limited on this 
issue in French context (Labelle and Schatt, 2005; Lakhal, 2004).  
Gelb (2000) used a sample of 3,219 US listed companies on the period 1981-1993 to examine the relationship 
between ownership concentration and disclosure in the USA where ownership is widely dispersed. The author 
concludes that ownership dispersion increases outsiders’ information demand and thus firm disclosure. In a 
context of capital concentration such as in French listed firms, the main agency conflict opposes controlling 
shareholders  to  minority  ones.  Controlling  shareholders  have  incentives  and  opportunities  to  expropriate 
minority shareholders; moreover they staff many of the senior position which gives them an unlimited access to 
information. They are therefore less reluctant to disclose information to public in order to protect their position. 
The above discussion suggests the alternative hypothesis: 
H6: There is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and ownership concentration 
 
Family controlled firms have a special behaviour, family members participate in the management of the firms 
and according to Pichard-Stamford (2002), there are usually confusion between family value and firm value, 
families  act  as  “entrepreunorial”  worried  to  preserve  the  firms  from  curious  competitors  and  to  protect  it 
competitive advantage. According to proprietary cost theory, family controlled firms have an incentive not to 
disclose information that will reduce their competitive position. 
 
In addition, Chau and Gray (2002) document that family controlled firms may have less demand for corporate 
disclosure than Anglo-American firms because the major providers of finance already have that information. We 
suggest therefore the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: Family controlled firms provide poor disclosure quality 
La  Porta  et  al.  (1998,  2000))  argue  that  countries  with  civil  law  system  as  France  present  weak  investor 
protection and higher private benefits of control. In France, firms have the possibility of issuing shares with 
double voting right when they are registered for at least two years. The deviation from one-share one-vote   6
increases the risk of minority shareholders expropriation and amplifies the agency problem between controlling 
shareholders and minority ones. The separation of cash flows right and voting rights facilitate the expropriation 
of minority shareholders.  
When controlling shareholders hold cash flow rights below to their control rights, they don’t support all the 
consequences of their vote.  They have more incentives to exploit small shareholders and have less incentive for 
transparent  disclosure  since  they  already  have  that  information.  Controlling  shareholders  can  expropriate 
minority interest and enrich themselves through connected party transactions in which profits are transferred to 
other companies they control. Consequently firms adopting dissociation between voting rights and cash flow 
rights are likely to provide poor disclosure quality 
H8: there is a negative association between disclosure quality and the dissociation between voting rights 
and cash flow rights 
3.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
  Sample 
The sample is selected from firms listed on Paris Stock Exchange and part of SBF 120 index in 2004 (120 
biggest companies). Following Depoers (2000), we eliminate financial and insurance companies because of their 
specific disclosure requirements and  financial characteristics. Second, 9 companies  were excluded  from  the 
sample because of data lacking. Finally, 5 outliers were excluded from the sample. The final sample is composed 
of 86 companies, as shown in Table 1a. A list of the companies included in the sample is reported in the 
Appendix. 
We choose the year 2004 because of information availability about disclosure quality. The measure is collected 
from a study made by AGEFFI and Euronext in 2004. This study mentions many companies who were short 
listed for a disclosure price. We suggest that the nominated firms have a good disclosure quality. 
  Measurement of variable 
According to Marston and Shrives (1991), managers use multiple channels to disclose information to public. 
Some are formal (annual and quarterly reports…), and others are informal (analyst meeting, conference calls…). 
Lung  and  Lundholm  (2003) find  a  positive  relationship  between  financial  disclosure  level  and  the  level  of 
information included in annual report. 
The disclosure quality is a very difficult variable to measure in a French context. In the USA, there are many 
organisms of disclosure quotation for example AIMR (Association of Investment Management Research), FAF 
(Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee), there is no similar ones in France. In recent 
research published by Labelle and Schatt (2005) had used a survey handled by Nelson Sofres Institut for AGEFI 
and Euronext in 2000. This survey award different prices to listed companies for the quality of it disclosure, by 
compartment of quotation (New Market, etc.), by means of disclosure (annual reports, etc.) and by type of 
operations on the market (first introduction on the Stock Exchange, etc.). A similar study was conducted in 2004; 
for our study need, we retained the best annual report price. This first step of the survey present a shortlist of 
SBF120 companies who present good annual report quality and the second step consist in electing the best 
annual report. Our dependant variable DISCL equal to 1 if the firm was nominated and 0 otherwise. 
We measure institutional investor control by the percentage of capital shares held by institutional investors. 3 
proxies are used to characterise board structure, the board size (CONSEIL), the independence of the board 
(INDEPEND) and leadership duality (CUMUL). In the USA and the UK, the concept of independent director is 
close to outside/non executive concept. We base our research on the definition given by the Bouton report (2002) 
“a director is independent when he maintains no relation whatever nature it is with the company, its group or its 
management, which can compromise the exercise of its freedom of judgement”. 
We include 3 proxies for ownership structure relying on Demstz and Lehn (1985) measures. We measure capital 
concentration by the Herfindhal index, calculated by summing the squared percentages of capital held by each   7
shareholder. We also measure the percentage of voting rights held by the largest and the second important 
shareholder. 
Bebchuck et al. (1999) present mechanisms that allow to a controlling shareholder to maintain the complete 
control of the firm while he owned a relative low capital level. Indeed, issuing two categories of shares: shares 
with voting right and shares without results in separating voting rights and cash flow rights. This leads us to 
affine our model by using a second ownership concentration variable noted VOT1 and VOT2 which could take 
in consideration control rights (voting rights). We introduce a dummy variable FAM when a firm is controlled 
by a family. We introduce a continuous variable (INV2) measuring the proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors. Finally we introduce 4 controlled variables: LNTA, COTATION, CAC40 and D/A. The first measures 
the size of the firm. COTATION and CAC40 are dummies, COTATION equal 1 if the firm is listed at a foreign 
market ad 0 otherwise. CAC40 equal 1 if the firm forms part of the CAC40 index and 0 otherwise.  
{Insert table 2 – about here} 
Table 2 summarises variable definition and measurement. Data on ownership structure are handly collected from 
firm’s  annual  reports  or  from  their  official  sites.  Other  accounting  and  financial  data  were  collected  from 
Compustat database. 
4.  RESULTS 
We  present  first,  the  exploratory  analysis  (ACP,  ACM)  then  the  confirmatory  analysis.  We  will  discuss 
respectively the results (logistic regression). 
  Exploratory analysis  
We  suggest  using  in  exploratory  phase,  multidimensional  methodologies  of  analysis  to  study  the  relation 
between  the  mechanisms  of  corporate  governance  and  the  quality  of  disclosure,  by  considering  few 
characteristics of the firm: the CAC40 membership, cross-listing, and US listing. 
 
We analyze for this objective a table of 86 lines corresponding to companies and of 14 columns for the variables 
of our inquiry. 
 
We use two factorial approaches, associated respectively with two different codings of our variables, continuous 
then  qualitative.  The  following  methods  are  the  Principal  component  analysis  (PCA)  and  the  multiple 
correspondence analysis (MCA). In prerequisite of the multidimensional analysis, we make a bivariate analysis 
on the table 3 which presents characterisations by the active modalities of the study of the two categories of 
firms (firms with good disclosure and firms with poor disclosure). The statistical test used is V-test at the level of 
2.1 with a risk of 5 %. It combines the power recovering of a modality in a class and its discriminating power 
discriminating towards the other group. The modalities are ranked in decreasing order by their relevance for 
every group. 
 
These first results show that: 
-Companies  with  good  disclosure  quality  are  not  controlled  by  families  and  are  respectively 
characterised by high proportion of independent directors, the US listing, Executive stock-options plans, CAC40 
membership and cross listing. It is also characterised by low ownership concentration as measured by a low 
Herfindhal index and low voting rights of the first shareholder.  
- Firms with poor disclosure is characterised respectively by a non independent board, are not listed in 
foreign markets, aren’t part of CAC40 index, don’t offer stock options plans to their managers and aren’t US 
listed. Also, those companies are usually controlled by families and present a high capital share concentration. 
4.1.1  Principal component analysis 
The principal component analysis consider only categorical variable. The two first axis sums up respectively 
38.31% and 15.78% of the information. 
The interpretation of the factorial plan reveals an opposition between: On one hand, cross listing, executive 
stock-option plans, firm size, CAC40 membership, board independence and significant institutional investor   8
ownership. On the other hand, ownership concentration, family control and family control. Moreover, the figure 
shows that institutional investor prefer non controlled families. 
 
figure1 : ACP quantitatives variables 
4.1.2  Multiple correspondence analysis  
The analysis of the multiple correspondences on our sample required to make a recoding of the quantitative 
variables (recoding in appendix) to position them collectively with the categorical variables of the study. 
 
The two panels A and B are projected in terms of supplementary variables in the analysis. The interest of this 
recoding is to allow us to study and to put in evidence on the mapping not only the strong values of the variables 
but also the weak ones. This leads us to better characterise both groups of individuals of the sample, those who 
have a good disclosure quality and those who have poor disclosure quality. 
We  observe,  at  the  same  time  for  firms  having  communicated  well  and  for  those  having  less  indeed 
communicated the relative incidences of the various aspects of corporate governance mechanisms on the first 
factorial plan of the analysis of the multiple correspondences (Figure 2).   9
 
Figure 2: ACM categorical variables  
 
YESCOM/NOCOM:  good/poor  disclosure  quality,  DEPEND:  low  proportion  of  outside  directors,  YESFAM 
/NOFAM:  family/non  family  controlled  firm,  INV1/INV3:  low/high  institutional  investor  ownership, 
HERFIND1/HERFIND3: low/high ownership concentration, 1VOT1/1VOT3: low/high voting rights of the first 
shareholder,  YESCOT/NOCOT:  yes/no  cross  listing,  USCOT/NOUSCOT:  yes/no  US  listing, 
YESCAC40/NOCAC40: yes/no CAC40 index,  
 
First the figure 2 shows that the factorial axis is the “quality disclosure” axis which opposes firms with good 
disclosure quality and firms with poor disclosure quality. Firms composing Panel B are companies with poor 
disclosure. They presents a low institutional investor ownership, are family controlled firms, no cross listed, non 
US listed, non CAC40 membership. In addition, they present double voting rights shares, small sized firms, non 
independent board, and high ownership concentration.  
On the right side of the first factorial axis, we observe that the closest characteristics to NOCOM are NOSO: non 
executive stock option plans, INV1: little presence of institutional investors in capital, FAM: family controlled 
firms, NOCOT: no multi-quotation, NOUSCOT:  no US listing and NOCAC40: no CAC40 membership. A little 
more remote but always in the same ellipse, we find capital concentration measured by a high Herfindhal index, 
1VOT1: the importance of control of the principal shareholder measured by a high level of his voting rights and 
the existence of double voting right shares which measure the dissociation between by cash flow and voting 
rights. These last results are coherent with our first hypotheses. 
Moreover, on the left side of the factorial plan, the multiple correspondence analysis shows that firms with good 
disclosure quality aren’t controlled by families. They are characterized US quotation and are part of CAC40 
index. Indeed, the quotation on the American market constrains the firm to comply with very strict obligations of 
disclosure, besides the strong presence of foreign investors who are very demanding in information. Moreover 
these firms have a high institutional investor ownership an independent board and a well dispersed ownership 
measured by a low proportion of the largest shareholders voting rights and a low Herfindhal index. According to 
the agency theory, low concentration of the capital and weak percentage voting rights of the first shareholder 
reduce the weight of the controlling shareholders in particular in the decision-making notably that concerning the 
financial publication. 
4.1.3  Confirmatory analysis results 
 
First,  we  notice  that  the  2  correct  ranks  are  high,  approximately  80%.  Coefficients  and  Z-statistics  are 
respectively reported. 
 
Concerning  the  internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  only  variables  INDEPEND  is  significant  and 
corresponding to the predicted sign. Consequently, companies with good disclosure quality may have more 
Panel A  Panel B   10 
independent directors in its board. Besides, the board size and the leadership duality do not seem to influence 
disclosure quality. This result can be explained by the hypothesis of substitution between good disclosure and 
these two corporate governance mechanisms. Disclosure seems to replace the ineffectiveness of a failing internal 
mechanism such as the separation of the two functions cited above. 
 
Hypothesis  1,  which  predicts  that  institutional  ownership  influences  positively  disclosure  quality,  is  not 
supported.  The  coefficient  of  variable  INV  which  represent  the  proportion  of  capital  held  by  institutional 
investors  is  not  significant  and  have  opposite  direction.  These  results  are  coherent  with  those  found  by 
Ginglinger and l’Her (2002): only foreigner institutional investors could influence manager incentive to provide 
more information about the firm and consequently enhance their disclosure quality. One possible explanation is 
that French investors held large percentage of shares and may act as controlling shareholders 
 
 We can see from capital concentration variables that French companies held by large controlling shareholder 
(VOT1)  are  less  likely  to  provide  good  disclosure  quality.  Moreover,  there  is  a  negative  and  significant 
association  between  share  ownership  concentration,  as  measured  by  the  Herfindhal  index  (HERFI),  and 
corporate  disclosure  quality.  Our  first  hypothesis  is  confirmed,  we  conclude  that  under  high  ownership 
concentration,  controlling  shareholders  may  expropriate  minority  shareholders  and  exploit  private  benefits, 
therefore they retain information in order to protect themselves. Our result is in accordance with Ho and Wong 
(2001), Chau and Gray (2002) and Eng and Mak (2003). 
 
Moreover, the equation 2 show a negative and significant coefficient at 1% between disclosure quality and 
family control which valid our second hypothesis. Family controlled firms provide poor disclosure. Our result is 
similar to those found by Chau and Gray (2002) on a sample of 133 Hong Kong and Singapore companies. 
Firms controlled by families have little incentive to disclose information to public for many reasons. First, the 
demand for information in such companies is relatively weak because the major providers of finance already 
have that information; these families staff many of the senior positions. Second, these families are controlling 
shareholders, they have incentives to retain information and expropriate minority shareholders. 
Hypothesis 5 assumes disclosure quality is positively associated with the existence of executive stock option 
plans. We use a dummy variable to measure the influence of executive stock option plans on disclosure quality. 
The  relationship  found  between  DISCL  and  SO  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Our  results 
corroborated this hypothesis and are similar to prior literature. They suggest that managers are motivated to 
enhance their disclosure in order to increase market stock prices and improve their wealth (Kim et Verrecchia 
(1994), (Diamond et Verrechia (1991)). 
The result regression show a negative association between double voting right shares and disclosure quality we 
suggest that double voting right grant have a negative effect on disclosure. 
Finally, we find a positive relationship between US listing and disclosure quality we conclude that American 
market is  more demanding in information that the other  markets;  this explains the significance of  USCOT 
variable and the non significance of COTATION. 
 
Firms listed on the American market are subjected to a very strict requirements rule in financial disclosure, what 
explains the positive relation enter US quotation and the disclosure quality. Furthermore, the significant presence 
of foreign institutional investors in the capital shares of US listed firms guarantees the good quality of their 
financial disclosure. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Characterised  by  strong  ownership  concentration  and  poor  protection  of  minority  shareholders,  the  French 
context appears to be an interesting one, as it allow us to shed light over the conflicts of interests between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This study shows that disclosure quality is weak in firms 
with strong ownership concentration and where controlling shareholders hold double voting right shares. 
The objective of this paper is to verify whether the disclosure quality of the French companies is a function of 
corporate  governance  mechanisms.  Prior  studies  confirmed  this  relation  in  the  American  context,  which  is 
characterised by dispersed ownership. A particular interest of our study is to test this relation considering the 
existence  of  important  institutional  differences.  Indeed,  the  French  ownership  is  characterised  by  a  strong   11 
concentration of the capital share (La Porta et al (1999)), Faccio et al. (2002)) and a poor protection of the 
investors with regard to the Anglo-Saxon countries (La Porta et al. (1998, 2000)). 
Our results are coherent with those found by Gelb (2000) in the USA: firms presenting good disclosure quality 
have lower ownership concentration. These firms have large proportion of independent directors in their boards 
and they grant stock options plans for their managers. Moreover, they are not controlled by families, and they do 
not have double voting right shares. It is also important to notice that firms which are listed in the USA exhibit 
better disclosure quality. This could be explained by the fact that the US Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) constrain firms to comply with restrictive disclosure requirements. We can also assume that American 
institutional investors contribute to the adoption of American corporate governance standards; consequently their 
presence in the capital is a guarantee for minority shareholders protection in case of concentrated ownership. 
In conclusion, the results obtained for French listed firms are coherent with prior studies (Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Gelb, 2000, Labelle and Schatt, 2005; Bushee and Noe, 2000). We make a contribution to the growing literature 
on the conflict opposing controlling shareholders to minority ones. Controlling shareholders are in position to 
extract private benefits from minority ones, since they have more incentives to exploit small shareholders and 
retain information. Moreover, understanding why firms improve their disclosure quality is useful for standard 
setters  and  regulators.  Since  family  controlled  firms  and  firms  with  high  ownership  concentration  are  less 
transparent then their counterparts, should regulatory authorities impose them more disclosure requirements? 
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Annexes 
Table 1: Variable definition and measurement   
 
Variable  Definition  Measurement 
Dependent variable:        
DISCL  Disclosure quality  Dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm 
have a good disclosure quality and 0 
otherwise 
Independent variables:       
HERFI  Herfindhal index measuring 
ownership concentration 
The  squared sum of shares percentages 
VOT1  Large shareholder  Percentage of voting rights held by the 
largest shareholder 
VOT2  Second shareholder  Percentage of voting rights held by the 
second largest shareholder 
CONSEIL  Board size  number of directors in the board 
INDEPEND  Board independence  percentage of independent directors in 
the board 
FAM  Family ownership  Dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm is 
controlled by a family and 0 otherwise 
DOUBLE  Double voting shares  Dummy variable coded as 1 if there is a 
double voting shares and 0 otherwise 
VA  Separation between property 
and voting rights 
Voting rights divided by the portion of 
shares of the largest shareholder 
INV  Institutional investor’s 
ownership 
Percentage of shares held by institutional 
investor 
SO  Stocks option plans  Dummy coded as 1 if executives benefit 
from stock option plans and 0 otherwise 
TAILLE  Size  Log of total assets 
COTATION  Foreign quotation  Dummy coded as 1 if the firm is listed 
on foreign market and 0 otherwise 
USCOT  US listing  Dummy coded as 1 if the firm is listed 
on US market and 0 otherwise 
DETTE  Leverage  Total liabilities divided by total assets 
CAC40  CAC40 membership  Dummy coded as 1 if the firm forms part 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of continuous variables 
 
Summary statistics are based on a sample of 86 French listed firms included in the SBF120 index. DISC is coded 
1 if the firm provide good disclosure quality and 0 otherwise, INDEPEND measure the independence of the 
board, CONSEIL measure the board size, CUMUL equal 1 if the CEO is the chairman of the board, HERFI 
measure the ownership concentration  and is calculates the sum of the squared shares percentages. VOT1 is 
voting rights of the first large shareholder, FAM equals 1 if a large shareholder is a family and 0 otherwise, SO 
is coded 1 if executives benefit from stock option plans and 0 otherwise, COTATION equals 1 if the firm is 
cross listed and 0 otherwise, , VA is the voting right of the first shareholder divided by his shares portion, INV is 
the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors, DETTE is the ratio of total debt per total assets, 
TAILLE is the log of total assets. 
 
Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
 
    Weight  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
CONSEIL     85,00   10,81   3,97   3,00   20,00 
INDEPEND     85,00   0,45   0,22   0,00   1,00 
HERFI     86,00   0,15   0,17   0,00   0,73 
VOT1     86,00   0,33   0,25   0,01   0,85 
VOT2     86,00   0,09   0,08   0,00   0,38 
INV     86,00   0,40   0,26   0,00   0,95 
DETTE     86,00   21,13   192,62   0,00  1 797,00 




Descriptive statistics of categorical variables 
                 
      Variables  Population  Frequency    
   DISCL  Poor disclosure quality  59  68,6    
      Good disclosure quality  27  31,4    
   CUMUL  No leadership duality  35  40,7    
      Leadership duality  50  58,82    
   FAM  Non family controlled  43  50    
      Family controlled  43  50    
   DOUBLE  No double voting right shares  40  46,51    
      double voting right shares  46  53,49    
   SO  No executive stock option plans  33  38,37    
      executive stock option plans   53  61,63    
   COTATION  No foreign quotation  44  51,16    
      foreign quotation  42  48,84    
   CAC40  No CAC40 membership  71  82,56    
      CAC40 membership  15  17,44    
   USCOT  No US listing  64  74,42    
      US listing  22  25,58    
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Tableau 3 :  Recoding continuous variables to categorical variables and characterisation 
of the dependent variable DISCL by the modalities of the classes 
 
1-  Recoding quantitative variables in categorical variables: 
•  If DISCL equals 1 then C2=YESCOM else C2 = NOCOM, 
•  HERFI is shared in 3 classes, we find in an increasing rank C6=HERFIND1, C6=HERFIND2 and 
C6=HERFIND3, 
•  Similarly  to  HERFI,  the  variable  VOT1  is  shared  in  3  classes  C7=1VOT1,  C7=1VOT2  and 
C7=1VOT3, 
•  DOUBLE is shared in 2 classes C10=YESDOUBLE and C10=NODOUBLE 
•  If FAM equals 1 then C9=YESFAM else C9 = NOFAM, 
•  INV is shared in 3 classes, we present in increasing rank : C11=INV1, C11=INV2 and C11=INV3, 
•  SO variable is shared in two classes C12=YESSO else C12=NOSO 
•  If COTATION equals 1 then C12=YESCOT else C12=NOCOT 
•  If CAC40 equals 1 then C15=YESCAC40 else C15 = NOCAC40, 
•  If USCOT equals 1 then C12=USCOT else C12=NOUSCOT 
•  Similarly to previous variable INV, the variable TAILLE, which measures size, is shared in 3 classes: 
C15=TAILLE1, C15=TAILLE2 and C15=TAILLE3. 
•  the  variable  INDEPEND  is  shared  in  3  classes,  we  find  in  the  increasing  order  C5=DEPEND, 
C5=INTERMEDIAIRE, C5=INDEPEND 
•  in the same way, the variable CONSEIL is shared in 3 classes : C3= CONSEIL1,  C3= CONSEIL2, 
C3= CONSEIL3, 
•  if CUMUL=1 then C4=PDG else C4=NOPDG, 
 
2-  Characterisation by modality of the class of the variable 
 
Class: C2=NOCOM   (number of firms:     59  -  Percentage: 68.60 
%)             
Variables  Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the 
modality in 
the class 
% of the 
modality in 
the sample 
% of the 
class in the 
modality 
V-Test  Probability  Weight 
DISCL  C2=NOCOM  100,00  68,60  100,00  9,79  0,000  59 
HERFI  C6=HERFIND3  47,46  32,56  100,00  4,65  0,000  28 
VOT1  C7=1VOT3  47,46  32,56  100,00  4,65  0,000  28 
FAM  C9=YESFAM  62,71  48,84  88,10  3,66  0,000  42 
USCOT  C17=NOUSCOT  86,44  74,42  79,69  3,43  0,000  64 
SO  C12=NOSO  49,15  37,21  90,63  3,30  0,000  32 
CAC 40  C16=NOCAC40  86,44  75,58  78,46  3,12  0,001  65 
COTATION  C13=NOCOT  64,41  52,33  84,44  3,12  0,001  45 
INDEPEND  C5=DEPEND  42,37  33,72  86,21  2,33  0,010  29 
                       
HERFI  C6=HERFIND1  23,73  33,72  48,28  -2,62  0,004  29 
VOT1  C7=1VOT1  22,03  33,72  44,83  -3,11  0,001  29 
COTATION  C13=YESCOT  35,59  47,67  51,22  -3,12  0,001  41 
CAC 40  C16=YESCAC40  13,56  24,42  38,10  -3,12  0,001  21 
SO  C12=YESSO  50,85  62,79  55,56  -3,30  0,000  54 
USCOT  C17=USCOT  13,56  25,58  36,36  -3,43  0,000  22 
INDEPEND  C5=INDEPEND  20,34  33,72  41,38  -3,60  0,000  29 
FAM  C9=NOFAM  37,29  51,16  50,00  -3,66  0,000  44 
DISCL  C2=YESCOM  0,00  31,40  0,00  -9,79  0,000  27   17 








| NUMERO |   VALEUR   | POURCENTAGE | POURCENTAGE |                                                                                  
| 
|        |   PROPRE   |             |    CUMULE   |                                                                                  
| 
+--------+------------+-------------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|    1   |   4.2139   |     38.31   |     38.31   | *********************************************************************** 
| 
|    2   |   1.7360   |     15.78   |     54.09   | *********************************                                                
| 
|    3   |   1.1901   |     10.82   |     64.91   | ***********************                                                          
| 
|    4   |   0.9845   |      8.95   |     73.86   | *******************                                                              
| 
|    5   |   0.7013   |      6.38   |     80.24   | **************                                                                   
| 
|    6   |   0.6289   |      5.72   |     85.95   | ************                                                                     
| 
|    7   |   0.5625   |      5.11   |     91.07   | ***********                                                                      
| 
|    8   |   0.4423   |      4.02   |     95.09   | *********                                                                        
| 
|    9   |   0.2661   |      2.42   |     97.51   | ******                                                                           
| 
|   10   |   0.2249   |      2.04   |     99.55   | *****                                                                            
| 




Class: C2=YESCOM   (number of firms     27 - Percentage: 
31.40%)             
Variables  Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the 
modality in 
the class 
% of the 
modality in 
the sample 
% of the 
class in the 
modality 
V-Test  Probability  Weight 
DISCL  C2=YESCOM  100,00  31,40  100,00  9,79  0,000  27 
FAM  C9=NOFAM  81,48  51,16  50,00  3,66  0,000  44 
INDEPEND  C5=INDEPEND  62,96  33,72  58,62  3,60  0,000  29 
USCOT  C17=USCOT  51,85  25,58  63,64  3,43  0,000  22 
SO  C12=YESSO  88,89  62,79  44,44  3,30  0,000  54 
CAC 40  C16=YESCAC40  48,15  24,42  61,90  3,12  0,001  21 
COTATION  C13=YESCOT  74,07  47,67  48,78  3,12  0,001  41 
VOT1  C7=1VOT1  59,26  33,72  55,17  3,11  0,001  29 
HERFI  C6=HERFIND1  55,56  33,72  51,72  2,62  0,004  29 
                       
INDEPEND  C5=DEPEND  14,81  33,72  13,79  -2,33  0,010  29 
COTATION  C13=NOCOT  25,93  52,33  15,56  -3,12  0,001  45 
CAC 40  C16=NOCAC40  51,85  75,58  21,54  -3,12  0,001  65 
SO  C12=NOSO  11,11  37,21  9,38  -3,30  0,000  32 
USCOT  C17=NOUSCOT  48,15  74,42  20,31  -3,43  0,000  64 
FAM  C9=YESFAM  18,52  48,84  11,90  -3,66  0,000  42 
VOT1  C7=1VOT3  0,00  32,56  0,00  -4,65  0,000  28 
HERFI  C6=HERFIND3  0,00  32,56  0,00  -4,65  0,000  28 
DISCL  C2=NOCOM  0,00  68,60  0,00  -9,79  0,000  59   18 
Tableau 5 : Correlation matrix 
The following table summarizes bivariate correlation between independent and dependent variables. DISC is coded 1 if the firm provide good disclosure quality and 0 
otherwise, INDEPEND measure the independence of the board, CONSEIL measure the board size, CUMUL equal 1 if the CEO is the chairman of the board, HERFI measure 
the ownership concentration  and is calculates the sum of the squared shares percentages. VOT1 is voting rights of the first large shareholder, FAM equals 1 if a large 
shareholder is a family and 0 otherwise, SO is coded 1 if executives benefit from stock option plans and 0 otherwise, COTATION equals 1 if the firm is cross listed and 0 
otherwise, , VA is the voting right of the first shareholder divided by his shares portion, INV is the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors, DETTE is the ratio 




   DISCL  CONSEIL  CUMUL  INDEPEND  HERFI  VOT1  VOT2  FAM  DOUBLE  INV  SO  COTATION  DETTE  TAILLE  CAC40  USCOTATION 
DISCL 
1                                              
                                               
CONSEIL  0,166  1                                           
0,129                                              
CUMUL 
0,109  ,261(*)  1                                        
0,322  0,016                                           
INDEPEND  ,448(**)  0,167  -0,003  1                                     
0  0,127  0,977                                        
HERFI 
-,436(**)  -0,053  -0,041  -,389(**)  1                                  
0  0,631  0,711  0                                     
VOT1  -,493(**)  -0,113  0,014  -,441(**)  ,942(**)  1                               
0  0,302  0,895  0  0                                  
VOT2 
0,018  0,079  -0,043  0,015  -0,102  -0,077  1                            
0,871  0,473  0,693  0,895  0,351  0,483     0,199                         
FAM 
-,488(**)  -,248(*)  -0,014  -,396(**)  ,289(**)  ,390(**)  0,141  1                         
0  0,022  0,898  0  0,007  0  0,199                            
DOUBLE 
-,234(*)  -0,133  0,189  -0,106  0,013  0,13  0,024  ,365(**)  1                      
0,031  0,226  0,083  0,335  0,905  0,236  0,824  0,001                         
INV  ,310(**)  ,307(**)  0,161  ,322(**)  -,382(**)  -,441(**)  -0,05  -,489(**)  -0,088  1                   
0,004  0,004  0,14  0,003  0  0  0,65  0  0,421                      
SO 
,374(**)  0,208  0,189  ,340(**)  -,335(**)  -,306(**)  0,046  -0,039  0,113  0,079  1                
0  0,056  0,084  0,001  0,002  0,004  0,677  0,72  0,303  0,475                   
COTATION 
,403(**)  ,271(*)  0,09  ,339(**)  -,251(*)  -,309(**)  0,037  -,459(**)  -,292(**)  0,122  0,118  1             
0  0,012  0,412  0,002  0,02  0,004  0,739  0  0,007  0,268  0,281                
DETTE 
-0,074  -0,132  -0,13  -0,056  -0,057  -0,049  0,015  -0,11  -0,118  -0,035  -0,14  0,113  1          
0,499  0,228  0,235  0,609  0,602  0,654  0,89  0,314  0,28  0,752  0,2  0,303             
TAILLE  ,341(**)  ,638(**)  ,239(*)  ,262(*)  -0,136  -,223(*)  -0,165  -,401(**)  -0,118  ,340(**)  0,143  ,449(**)  -0,132  1       
0,001  0  0,028  0,015  0,215  0,04  0,131  0  0,283  0,001  0,192  0  0,23          
CAC40 
,214(*)  ,387(**)  ,262(*)  0,051  -0,182  -0,211  -0,007  -0,16  0,055  0,212  ,232(*)  0,171  -0,05  ,575(**)  1    
0,049  0  0,015  0,643  0,095  0,052  0,949  0,144  0,619  0,051  0,032  0,118  0,647  0       
USCOTATION 
,429(**)  ,233(*)  0,147  0,141  -,241(*)  -,264(*)  -0,023  -0,143  -0,184  0,187  0,107  ,539(**)  -0,062  ,322(**)  0,164  1 
0  0,032  0,18  0,197  0,026  0,015  0,832  0,191  0,092  0,087  0,328  0  0,57  0,003  0,133      19 
Tableau n°6: Régression Logit portant sur la qualité des rapports annuels  
 
Summary statistics are based on a sample of 86 French listed firms included in the SBF120 index. DISC is coded 
1 if the firm provide good disclosure quality and 0 otherwise, INDEPEND measure the independence of the 
board, CONSEIL measure the board size, CUMUL equal 1 if the CEO is the chairman of the board, HERFI 
measure the ownership concentration  and is calculates the sum of the squared shares percentages. VOT1 is 
voting rights of the first large shareholder, FAM equals 1 if a large shareholder is a family and 0 otherwise, SO 
is coded 1 if executives benefit from stock option plans and 0 otherwise, COTATION equals 1 if the firm is 
cross listed and 0 otherwise, , VA is the voting right of the first shareholder divided by his shares portion, INV is 
the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors, DETTE is the ratio of total debt per total assets, 
TAILLE is the log of total assets. 
 
   Equation 1  Equation 2 
   B  Signif.  B  Signif. 
HERFI  -10,437  0,038**       
VOT1      -6,472  0,011** 
VOT2      2,546  0,541 
FAM  -2,652  0,004***     
DOUBLE      -1,131  0,075* 
INV      0,533  0,702 
SO  2,441  0,009***     
CUMUL      0,732  0,281 
INDEPEND      2,851  0,094* 
CONSEIL      0,011  0,901 
COTATION  0,155  0,857     
USCOT  2,282  0,016**     
CAC40  0,194  0,815       
TAILLE         
DETTE         
Constante  -1,451  0,153  -1,017  0,551 
Number of observations  86  86 
% of correct rank  89,5  78,8 
R
2 Nagelkerke  0,677  0,502 
              
 
* significant at the .01 level  
** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
 
 